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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, thousands of soccer fans showed up to the World Cup game
between the Netherlands and the Ivory Coast wearing pants in the colors of the
Dutch national team. The pants had been given out as promotional gifts by a
beer company. FIFA, the governing body of international soccer, objected. It
claimed trademark rights in the team colors, and giving out pants in those
colors was in FIFA's view "ambush marketing" that was likely to confuse those
who saw (or even those who wore) the pants into thinking that the soccer team
had sponsored the pants. And in FIFA's view, not only was giving out the pants
illegal, but individuals wearing them were falsely suggesting some affiliation
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with the Dutch national team. 1 Prohibited from wearing the pants into the
stadium, more than one thousand fans dutifully took their pants off and cheered
the Dutch team to victory in their (largely orange) underwear. 2 This was
Europe, after all, and it was an important match.
Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some
significant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant's use
of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number of consumers and not
otherwise.
As a general matter, this is the right rule. When it works well, trademark
law facilitates the workings of modem markets by permitting producers to
accurately communicate information about the quality of their products to
buyers, thereby encouraging them to invest in making quality products,
particularly in circumstances in which that quality wouldn't otherwise be
apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they will confuse
consumers, who won't know whether they are in fact getting a high quality
product. Indeed, some consumers will be stuck with lemons.
3
Unfortunately, as the FIFA case illustrates, trademark law has taken the
concept of confusion too far. Over the middle part of the twentieth century,
courts expanded the range of actionable confusion beyond confusion over the
actual source of a product-trademark law's traditional concern-to include
claims against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark
owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant's goods. This expansion
began for plausible reasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in
at least some cases in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually
compete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life
of its own, leading courts to declare as infringing a variety of practices that
might be confusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers' decision-
making process.
We think trademark law needs to refocus on confusion that is actually
relevant to purchasing decisions. Specifically, it should anchor once again to
the core case of confusion regarding the actual source of a defendant's product
1. FIFA appears to have objected to the pants because they were distributed by, and
bore the name of, Dutch brewer Bavaria, while FIFA had entered into a partnership
agreement with Anheuser-Busch making Budweiser the official beer of the World Cup.
Dutch Fans Watch Match in Their Underwear, ESPN SOCCERNET, June 17, 2006,
http://soccemet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=371466&cc=5901.
2. See Heather Smith, Goal Tending, IP LAW & Bus., Aug. 2006, at 28, 28; Dutch Fans
Watch Match in Their Underwear, supra note 1. FIFA apparently did not object that the
underwear too was orange.
3. Because of this uncertainty, consumers won't be willing to pay as much for that
quality. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES: ESSAYS THAT ENTERTAIN
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 7 (1984). We won't pay as




or service, the type of confusion most obviously related to consumer decision
making. Most cases of confusion regarding actual source will involve
competitive goods, but consumers may also mistakenly believe a mark owner is
the actual source of noncompetitive products that are closely related to the
mark owner's. We think genuine source confusion causes the same problems
whether or not the parties' goods compete directly, so trademark law should
treat as infringing any use that is likely to cause confusion about the actual
source of a product or service.
Some uses now viewed through the lens of sponsorship or affiliation raise
concerns analogous to those posed by source confusion, particularly those that
are likely to cause consumers to believe that the trademark owner stands behind
or guarantees the quality of the defendant's goods or services. Even if
consumers understand that individual franchisees, rather than the McDonald's
Corporation, actually make their hamburgers, they are likely to expect that
McDonald's assures the burgers' quality. But in those cases it is the fact that
consumers believe the brand owner guarantees the quality of the product that
leads to consumer harm if their belief is misguided. We therefore would define
the category of trademark infringement to include cases involving confusion as
to whether the plaintiff is responsible for the quality of the defendant's goods
or services in addition to those involving actual source confusion. And because
we believe these types of confusion will impact consumer decision making
with sufficient regularity, we argue that courts should presume materiality in
cases that fit in the trademark infringement category.
Cases that involve allegations of other forms of confusion, many of which
are now lumped into the "sponsorship or affiliation" category, should not be
regarded as trademark infringement cases. This does not mean, however, that
no other forms of confusion should ever be actionable. To the contrary, we
believe the law should regulate some statements that create confusion regarding
other types of relationships, but that claims directed to this other type of
confusion should be analogized to false advertising claims. False advertising
law, like trademark law, is designed to protect the integrity of markets by
allowing consumers to rely on statements made by sellers. While trademark law
prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of their products by
mimicking another's brand name, logo, or trade dress, the law of false
advertising prevents false or misleading statements about the nature or qualities
of one's own or a competitor's products. We think uses that cause confusion
about things other than control over quality are more like the statements
regulated by false advertising law than those traditionally regulated by
trademark law. Thus, uses that cause non-quality-related confusion should be
treated more like false advertising.
Importantly, false advertising law requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the misrepresentation is of a particular type 4 and that it is material-that it is
4. Indeed, the statute specifies the sorts of misrepresentations that are actionable.
January 2010]
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
likely to affect consumers' purchasing decisions. We think requiring proof of
materiality is desirable in the absence of confusion regarding responsibility for
quality, both because confusion regarding other types of relationships is less
likely to impact consumer purchasing decisions and because these claims are
responsible for so much of the cost of trademark law. Indeed, we think it is no
accident that the cases that pose the greatest threats to speech interests are
sponsorship or affiliation cases, as are many of the most troubling cases
involving new technologies, like the recent suits against search engines for
returning paid search results in response to search queries involving
trademarks. 
5
Our argument unfolds as follows. In Part I, we identify a number of
examples of "confusion" alleged by mark owners, many of which courts have
found actionable even in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to
matter to the operation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at this
unfortunate pass. In Part III, we argue that courts can begin to rein in some of
these excesses by focusing their attention on confusion that is actually relevant
to purchasing decisions. Uses of a trademark that cause confusion about actual
source or about responsibility for quality will often impact purchasing
decisions, so courts should presume materiality and impose liability when there
is evidence such confusion is likely. Uses alleged to cause confusion about
more nebulous relationships, on the other hand, are more analogous to false
advertising claims, and those uses should be actionable only when a plaintiff
can prove the alleged confusion is material to consumers' decision making. We
address the scope of such false advertising-like claims in Part IV. We continue
the discussion in Part V, which explores some of the implications of
distinguishing between different types of confusion and conceiving of some
claims as false advertising rather than trademark infringement claims, and we
discuss how to handle some close cases.
I. THIS Is NOT MY BEAUTIFUL MARK
6
Pantsless soccer fans (and those sitting next to them) are far from the only
victims of the broad modem conception of sponsorship or affiliation confusion.
In 2008, Major League Baseball began to crack down on the longstanding
practice by local Little Leagues of naming kids' baseball teams after major
league franchises. MLB's theory was that people watching the twelve-year-olds
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006) (forbidding misrepresentations as to the "nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin" of goods or services).
5. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 4:08-CV-626-A, 2009 WL 381995 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16,
2009) (denying Yahoo!'s motion to transfer venue in trademark infringement case based on
Yahoo!'s use of American Airlines as keyword); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 4:07-cv-
00487 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2007) (order denying Google's motion to dismiss).
6. With apologies to the Talking Heads and to anyone who hates cute heading titles.
[Vol. 62:413
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play for the Tinley Park Cubs would wrongly assume that the Chicago Cubs
had granted permission to or otherwise sponsored their eponymous Little
League counterparts. Faced with the prospect of suit, Little League teams
everywhere began renaming their teams.
7
In 2006, back when it was good, NBC's hit show Heroes depicted an
indestructible cheerleader sticking her hand down a kitchen garbage disposal
and mangling it (the hand quickly regenerated). It was an Insinkerator brand
garbage disposal, though you might have had to watch the show in slow motion
to notice; the brand name was visible for only a couple of seconds. Emerson
Electric, owner of the Insinkerator brand, sued NBC, alleging the depiction of
its product in an unsavory light was both an act of trademark dilution and was
likely to cause consumers to believe Emerson had permitted the use. NBC
denied any wrongdoing, but it obscured the Insinkerator name when it released
the DVD and Web versions of the episode. 8 And not just television shows but
also movies have provoked the ire of trademark owners: Caterpillar sued the
makers of the movie Tarzan on the theory that the use of Caterpillar tractors in
the movie to bulldoze the forest would cause consumers to think Caterpillar
was actually anti-environment, 9 and the makers of Dickie Roberts: Former
Child Star were sued for trademark infringement for suggesting that the star of
the absurdist comedy was injured in a Slip 'N Slide accident. 1 0 Even museums
aren't immune: Pez recently sued the Museum of Pez Memorabilia for
displaying an eight-foot Pez dispenser produced by the museum's owners.
I I
And forget about using kazoos on your duck tours: Ride the Ducks, a tour
company in San Francisco that gives out duck-call kazoos to clients on its
ducks, sued Bay Quackers, a competing duck tour company that also facilitated
quacking by its clients. 12
Most of these examples involve threats of suit, and they could be dismissed
7. See, e.g., Tim Cronin, MLB to Youth: You're Out, HERALD NEWS, May 27,
2008, available at http://www.suburbanchicagonews.com/heraldnews/news/
971947,4_1_JO27_LOGOS_S1.article; see also Katie Thomas, In Cape Cod League, It's
Tradition vs. Trademark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008 at B11 (discussing a similar claim
brought by MLB against the amateur Cape Cod League); Michael Masnick, Major League
Baseball Bullying Amateur Baseball in Trademark Shakedown, TECHDIRT, Mar. 13, 2008,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080312/013742509.shtml (same).
8. See Paul R. La Monica, NBC Sued over 'Heroes' Scene by Garbage Disposal
Maker, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 17, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/
2006/10/17/commentary/mediabiz/index.htm.
9. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (C.D. I11. 2003).
10. Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255-58 (N.D.
Cal. 2003).
11. Museum Faces Legal Battle over Giant Pez Dispenser, KTVU.coM, July 1, 2009,
http://www.ktvu.com/print/19911637/detail.html. The museum was originally called the Pez
Museum, but the owners changed the name in response to a previous objection from Pez.
12. Jesse McKinley, A Quacking Kazoo Sets Offa Squabble, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009,
at A16. Ducks are open-air amphibious vehicles that can be driven on streets and operated in
the water.
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simply as overreaching by a few aggressive trademark owners. But these
threats were not isolated incidents, and they shouldn't be quickly ignored. The
recipients of all of these threats, like many others who receive similar
objections, 13 knew well that they had to take the asserted claims seriously
because courts have sometimes been persuaded to shut down very similar uses.
In 1998, for instance, New Line Productions was set to release a comedy about
a beauty pageant that took place at a farm-related fair in Minnesota. New Line
called the movie Dairy Queens but was forced to change the name to Drop
Dead Gorgeous after the franchisor of Dairy Queen restaurants obtained a
preliminary injunction. 14 The owners of a restaurant called the "Velvet Elvis"
were forced to change its name after the estate of Elvis Presley sued for
trademark infringement. 15 A humor magazine called Snicker was forced to pull
a parody "ad" for a mythical product called "Michelob Oily," not because
people thought Michelob was actually selling such a beer (only six percent
did 6), but because a majority of consumers surveyed thought that the
magazine needed to receive permission from Anheuser-Busch to run the ad. 
1 7
And Snicker might face more trouble than that; another court enjoined a
furniture delivery company from painting its truck to look like a famous candy
bar. 
18
13. The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse collects letters from trademark owners that
make aggressive assertions of trademark (and other intellectual property) rights. See Chilling
Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). As of
February 25, 2009, the Chilling Effects database contained 378 such letters. Among the
many specious objections are an objection from the National Pork Board (owner of the
trademark "THE OTHER WHITE MEAT") to the operator of a breastfeeding advocacy site
called "The Lactivist" for selling T-shirts with the slogan "The Other White Milk," Pork
Board Has a Cow over Slogan Parody, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Jan. 30, 2007,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticelD=6418; from Kellogg to the
registrant of the domain name "evilpoptarts.com," Kelloggs Poops on Evilpoptarts.com,
CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, June 5, 2006, http://www.chillingeffects.org/
acpa/notice.cgi?NoticelD=4377; from Nextel to the registrants of the domain name
"nextpimp.com," Nextel Says "Don't Pimp My Mark", CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
June 22, 2005, http://www.chillingeffects.org/acpa/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2322; and from the
owners of the Marco Beach Ocean Resort to the operators of "urinal.net," a website that
collects pictures of urinals in various public places, for depicting urinals at the Resort and
identifying them as such, Mark Owner Pissed About Urinals, CHILLING EFFECTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, Jan. 4, 2005. http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/
notice.cgi?NoticelD= 1576.
14. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D.
Minn. 1998).
15. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
16. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1994).
That any consumers were confused was remarkable, and perhaps a statement about the
reliability of consumer confusion surveys rather than the stupidity of 6% of the population.
17. Id.
18. Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., No. 08-14463, 2008 WL 4724756 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 24, 2008). Hershey has also sued Reese's Nursery. Complaint at 1, Hershey
Chocolate & Confectionery Corp. v. Reese's Nursery and Landscaping, No. 3:09-CV-00017-
[Vol. 62:413
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The Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company persuaded a court to stop
Franklyn Novak from selling T-shirts and other merchandise bearing the phrase
"Mutant of Omaha" and depicting a side view of a feather-bonneted, emaciated
human head. 19 No one who saw Novak's shirts reasonably could have believed
Mutual of Omaha sold the T-shirts, but the court was impressed by evidence
that approximately ten percent of all the persons surveyed thought that Mutual
of Omaha "[went] along" with Novak's products. 20 The creators of Godzilla
successfully prevented the author of a book about Godzilla from titling the
book Godzilla, despite clear indications on both the front and back covers that
the book was not authorized by the creators.
2 1
The Heisman Trophy Trust prevented a T-shirt company called Smack
Apparel from selling T-shirts that used variations of the word HEISMAN, such
as "HE.IS.the.MAN," to promote particular players for the Heisman Trophy.
22
This was not Smack Apparel's first trademark lesson: a court previously
ordered it to stop selling T-shirts that used university colors and made oblique
references to those universities' football teams because the court believed the
designs created "a link in the consumer's mind between the T-shirts and the
Universities" and demonstrated that Smack Apparel "inten[ded] to directly
profit [from that link]."2 3 Respect Sportswear was denied registration of
"RATED R SPORTSWEAR" for men's and women's clothing on the ground
that consumers would be confused into thinking the Motion Picture Association
of America sponsored the clothes. 24 A street musician who plays guitar in New
York while (nearly) naked was permitted to pursue his claim against Mars on
the theory consumers would assume he sponsored M&Ms candies, since Mars
advertised M&Ms with a (naked) blue M&M playing a guitar. 25 A legitimate
reseller of dietary supplements lost its motion for summary judgment in a suit
by the supplements' brand owner because the court concluded the reseller
might have confused consumers into thinking it was affiliated with the brand
owner when it purchased ad space on Google and truthfully advertised the
JPB (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 19, 2009).
19. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
20. Id. at 400.
21. See Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1206, 1212 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
22. Heisman Trophy Trust v. Smack Apparel Co., No. 08 Civ. 9153(VM), 2009 WL
2170352, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009). Smack Apparel produced several such T-shirts,
including one that substituted the number 15 for "IS" in the word HEISMAN and was
printed in the colors of the University of Florida, clearly to promote Florida quarterback Tim
Tebow's candidacy. See Smack Apparel Lawsuit, LSU TIGER TALLER NEWSLETTER (LSU
Trademark Licensing, Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 30, 2009, at 6.
23. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2008).
24. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc. v. Respect Sportswear Inc., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1555, 1564 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
25. Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying Mars' motion
to dismiss plaintiff's false endorsement claim).
January 20101
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availability of the supplements. 26 Amoco persuaded a court that consumers
might believe it sponsored Rainbow Snow's sno-cones, mostly because
Rainbow Snow's shops were located in the same area as some of Amoco's
Rainbo gas stations. 27 The National Football League successfully sued the state
of Delaware for running a lottery based on point spreads in NFL games, even
though the Lottery never used the NFL name or any of its marks for the
purpose of identifying or advertising its games. 28 The court was persuaded that
the betting cards' references to NFL football games by the names of the cities
whose teams were playing might cause consumers to believe the NFL
sponsored the lottery game.29 And the owners of a Texas golf course that
replicated famous golf holes from around the world were forced to change their
course because one of the holes was, in the view of the Fifth Circuit, too similar
to the corresponding South Carolina golf hole it mimicked. 3o
Whatever fraction of the total universe of trademark cases these cases
constitute, there are enough of them that recipients of cease and desist letters
from mark owners have to take the objections seriously. Indeed many simply
cave in and change their practices rather than face the uncertainty of a lawsuit.
The producers of the TV show Felicity changed the name of the university
attended by characters on the show after New York University, the school
originally referenced, objected to the depiction of those students as sexually
active. 3 1 The producers of a movie originally titled Stealing Stanford changed
26. Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Discount, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 941
(E.D. Wis. 2008).
27. Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1984). Rainbow
Snow sold its snow cones from fourteen round, ten-by-six-foot booths, which were blue with
a 180-degree, red-orange-yellow-green rainbow appearing on the upper half of the face of
the booth and prominently displayed the name "Rainbow Snow" in white letters below the
rainbow. Id. at 557. Signs at Amoco's Rainbo gas stations displayed the word "Rainbo" in
white, with the word appearing against a black background and below a red-orange-yellow-
blue truncated rainbow logo. Id.
28. NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1376, 1380-81 (D. Del. 1977). The
lottery game was called "Scoreboard" and the individual games were identified as "Football
Bonus," "Touchdown," and "Touchdown II." Id. at 1380.
29. The cards on which the customers of the Delaware Lottery marked their betting
choices identified the next week's NFL football games by the names of the cities whose NFL
teams were scheduled to compete against each other (e.g., Washington v. Baltimore). Id. The
parties stipulated that, in the context in which they appeared, these geographic names were
intended to refer to, and consumers understood them to refer to, particular NFL football
teams. Id. This was enough for the court to find sponsorship or affiliation confusion because,
"[a]pparently, in this day and age when professional sports teams franchise pennants,
teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and a wide range of other products, a substantial number
of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct an enterprise of this kind
without NFL approval." Id. at 1381. The court therefore entered a limited injunction
"requiring the Lottery Director to include on Scoreboard tickets, advertising and any other
materials prepared for public distribution a clear and conspicuous statement that Scoreboard
[was] not associated with or authorized by the National Football League." Id.
30. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
31. Sara Lipka, PG-13? Not This College. Or That One. Or . . ., CHRON. HIGHER
[Vol. 62:413
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the title of their movie after Stanford University objected to the movie's
storyline, which centered on a student who stole money to pay tuition. 32 It's
possible that the producers of the show and the movie would have had
legitimate defenses had they decided to use the real universities' names despite
the objections, but in light of the case law outlined above, neither was willing
to defend its right to refer to real places in their fictional storylines.3 3 And
anecdotes like these are becoming depressingly common. Production of the
film Moneyball, which was based on Michael Lewis's best-selling profile of
Oakland Athletics General Manager Billy Beane, was halted just days before
shooting was set to begin in part because Major League Baseball disapproved
of the script's depiction of baseball and therefore objected to use of its
trademarks in the film. 34 Apparently Major League Baseball believes it can
control the content of any film that refers to real baseball teams.
What unifies all the cases that have given these creators such pause is that
courts found actionable confusion notwithstanding the fact that consumers
couldn't possibly have been confused about the actual source of the defendants'
products. No one could think a (probably) dead Elvis Presley was running a
kitsch bar in Texas, Dairy Queen had produced a beauty pageant comedy film,
the Chicago Cubs were playing Little League baseball,3 5 or the coastal golf
course they played in South Carolina had moved to the Texas plains. And while
it is possible that some consumers would think a soccer team was selling pants
with a beer logo on them, the makers of Godzilla had written a book about him,
Michelob was making a new beer called "Oily," the South Carolina golf course
had opened a new branch in Texas in cooperation with the seventeen other golf
courses the Texas course also mimicked, or Louisiana State University was
selling T-shirts that read "Beat Oklahoma" and "Bring it Back to the Bayou!"
(but which lacked the LSU name or logo), the plaintiffs in those cases either
couldn't or didn't try to prove any such source confusion. And under modem
law, they didn't have to.
The actionable confusion, according to these courts, was not confusion that
would have led consumers to buy the wrong product, or even to wrongly think
EDUC., June 26, 2009, at 1; William McGeveran, Trademarks, Movies, and the Clearance
Culture, INFO/LAW, July 2, 2009, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2009/07/02/tm-
movie-clearance/.
32. McGeveran, supra, note 31. Apparently Harvard was less troubled about a student
being depicted as having stolen money to pay its tuition: the movie was retitled Stealing
Harvard.
33. See also Vince Horiuchi, HBO Disputes Trademark Infringement in 'Big Love,'
SALT LAKE TRIB., July 8, 2009 (discussing a lawsuit filed by the University of Utah over the
three-second depiction of a fictional research report bearing the University of Utah logo).
34. Michael Cieply, Despite Big Names, Prestige Film Falls Through, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2009, at B1.
35. We mean really playing Little League baseball, not just playing little league-quality
baseball. The latter, as any good White Sox fan knows, would certainly have been
believable.
January 2010]
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they were buying from the trademark owner. Rather, the theory in all of these
cases was that consumers would think there was some relationship between the
trademark owner and the defendant based on the defendant's use of the
trademark. The problem with this formulation is that it fails to specify the types
of relationships about which confusion is relevant or the harm that supposedly
flows from confusion about those relationships. It is therefore impossible to
establish meaningful limits on what sorts of confusion are actionable. In Part
III, we address the possible harms that might flow from confusion as to
sponsorship or affiliation, as well as the harm that results from expanding
trademark law to cover such confusion.
First, though, we pause to consider how trademark law came to deem
confusion actionable even when it is entirely unrelated to the source of the
products. We do this because understanding why courts felt the need to expand
the scope of trademark law gives a context against which to evaluate modem
standards. It also helps us to see more clearly where the doctrine went off track.
II. WELL, How DID WE GET HERE?
3 6
Trademark law traditionally aimed to prevent competitors from diverting
consumers who, had they not been deceived, would have purchased from the
trademark owner. 37 Because they could only be confident that the confused
consumers otherwise would have gone to the mark owner when the defendant
offered the same goods or services as the mark owner, courts in this era focused
on uses of a trademark by direct competitors. And courts put heavy emphasis
on the direct part of this formulation. In one prototypical case, Borden Ice
Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co.,3 8 the court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that use of the BORDEN mark for ice cream infringed its rights in
BORDEN for milk and related products. 39 The court acknowledged that
simultaneous use of BORDEN for milk and ice cream might confuse
consumers, but it nevertheless denied the claim because the plaintiff could not
show the defendant's use of the same mark for noncompetitive products would
divert consumers who otherwise would have bought from the plaintiff. People
who want milk don't buy ice cream by mistake.
Cases like Borden seem anachronistic by modem lights, but the results in
these cases were a function of the limited purposes of early American
36. OK, we said we were sorry before, but now we really are.
37. See Coats v. Holbrook, 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 713, 717 (1845) (noting trademark law's
purpose of preventing a defendant from "attract[ing] to himself the patronage that without
such deceptive use of such names ... would have inured to the benefit of [the plaintiff]").
For a longer discussion of traditional trademark law principles, see generally Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1839
(2007).
38. 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
39. Id. at 515.
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trademark law and the economic climate in which courts developed traditional
doctrine. Specifically, because producers in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries sold relatively few products in limited geographic markets, 40
focusing on trade diversion naturally led courts to confine rights to uses by
parties in close competitive and geographic proximity. Doctrinally, courts
maintained these limits by finding infringement only when the defendant
caused confusion about the "source of origin" of its products, and they
interpreted "source of origin" quite literally. Since consumers were accustomed
to encountering only a limited range of products from any particular producer,
they were unlikely to believe that unrelated goods--even ones bearing the same
or a similar mark--came from the same source. Thus, a liability standard that
required evidence of confusion as to source of origin was essentially equivalent
to asking whether confusion would result in trade diversion.
But this tight fit between the requirement of source confusion and the focus
on trade diversion depended critically on the assumption that consumers would
not think unrelated goods came from the same source. That assumption became
increasingly problematic in the early- to mid-twentieth century as producers
began serving much wider geographic and product markets. 41 Consumers were
more frequently exposed to producers selling a variety of goods (or at least a
wider variety), just as they were beginning to understand that companies didn't
always themselves produce the products that bore their marks.
These new market dynamics put significant pressure on the traditional
doctrinal structure because confusion about source of origin was no longer a
perfect proxy for trade diversion if consumers believed producers made a
variety of products. But the tension also presented an opportunity for trademark
owners who wanted courts to protect their marks against noncompetitive goods
and services so they could expand into new markets. And by about the 1920s,
mark owners started having success convincing courts that trademark rights
should be expanded to account for changed circumstances. In Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.,42 for example, Aunt Jemima, which had used the
AUNT JEMIMA mark for syrup, alleged that Rigney's use of the AUNT
JEMIMA mark for flour infringed its rights in the mark. Aunt Jemima would
have lost this case if the court had applied traditional trademark principles since
Rigney was not diverting customers who were trying to purchase syrup. Indeed,
the court acknowledged that "no one wanting syrup could possibly be made to
take flour.' 43 Nevertheless, the court found infringement on the ground the
products were "so related as to fall within the mischief which equity should
prevent." 4
4
40. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 547, 575-79 (2006).
41. Id.
42. 247 F. 407, 408 (2d Cir. 1917).
43. Id. at 409.
44. Id. at 409-10
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Similarly in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,45 the court refused to allow
registration of YALE for flashlights and batteries in light of the plaintiffs prior
use of the YALE mark for locks. The court acknowledged that the decision
"[did] some violence to the language" of the Trademark Act of 1905, which
defined infringing uses of a mark as uses on goods "of the same descriptive
properties." 46 But the court claimed "it ha[d] come to be recognized that,
unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any
identification of the two, it is unlawful."47
Both Aunt Jemima and Yale Electric Corp. involved defendants using
marks identical to the plaintiffs' and for fairly closely related goods. Thus,
consumers in those cases might reasonably have believed that the plaintiffs
were the actual sources of origin of the defendants' goods, even if the plaintiffs
did not in fact sell those goods. Consumers might, for example, have actually
believed that Aunt Jemima sold both flour and syrup, given the complementary
nature of those products. Consumers who believed that, of course, still would
not have been deceived into buying flour when they intended to buy syrup. But
as a purely doctrinal matter, a court could plausibly conclude that the junior
user of the AUNT JEMIMA mark confused at least some consumers about the
"source of origin" of the defendant's products.
This approach to expanding the scope of trademark rights by interpreting
"source" confusion more broadly was pragmatic, particularly as compared to
the radical reconceptualization Frank Schechter had proposed. 48 By continuing
to focus on confusion as to source rather than adopting an entirely new
conceptual framework, courts could act as though they were breaking no new
ground, even as they were finding infringement when there was no risk of trade
diversion. 49 But while effective in capturing cases like Aunt Jemima, in which
consumers might have believed that the mark owner was the actual source of
the defendant's noncompeting goods, the doctrinal formulations courts adopted
were divorced from trademark law's traditionally limited purposes and had no
obvious limiting principles.
We doubt that was an accident. Courts had good reasons to prefer an ill-
defined standard in the face of rapidly changing economic circumstances, and
an open standard was certainly attractive to mark owners, who wanted courts to
protect their ability to enter new geographic and product markets. While it was
45. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
46. Id. at 974.
47. Id.
48. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 833 (1927) (arguing that unique marks deserved property-like protection against any
use in any context); cf Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88
IowA L. REv. 731, 735 (2003) (arguing that an implication of Schechter's theory is that
companies that sell many types of products have diluted their own marks).
49. See, e.g., Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair
Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 199 (1927).
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true that consumers were becoming more accustomed to producers offering a
variety of products, many consumers at this time still would not necessarily
have assumed that different products bearing the same mark came from the
same source, particularly when the products were very different.50 Nor was it
clear that consumers would have fully understood the varied production
arrangements mark owners were increasingly employing. Thus, a strict
insistence that the plaintiff demonstrate confusion regarding the actual source
of the defendant's goods may not have allowed for much expansion beyond
cases like Borden. It might also have stood in the way of potentially efficient
outsourcing. 5
To capture a broader range of conduct, courts began to find confusion
actionable when it caused consumers to think either (1) that the plaintiff
actually produced the defendant's goods or (2) that the plaintiff somehow
sponsored the defendant's goods or was affiliated with their producer. 52 In
50. Some commentators simply assumed away this problem. Lukens, supra note 49, at
204 ("As commercial organization becomes more complex, it is becoming more usual for a
corporation to manufacture or sell a wide variety of products. Many companies produce
articles that have no similarity, nor any relationship beyond the fact that they are so
produced. Such a concern frequently applies the same trade-name to all its products in the
hope that the good-will of the older products will attach to the newer ones. The public has
become so accustomed to the idea of dissimilar articles being produced by the same
company that it is hardly surprised at any combination whatever." (emphasis added)); see
also George W. Goble, Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects, 22 ILL. L. REv. 379, 388
(1927) (arguing against the requirement that the defendant's goods be of the "same class" as
the plaintiffs: "It seems reasonable to suppose that ordinarily identity of trade name or mark
in itself would sufficiently relate them to cause mental association as to the manufacture or
origin of the goods, dissimilar and unrelated though the goods may otherwise be").
51. Licensing posed serious conceptual problems in traditional trademark law because
courts in that era viewed "source" literally. When plaintiffs who had licensed production of
products bearing their marks sought to enforce their trademark rights, courts were faced with
two parties, neither of which was the actual source of the products bearing the mark at issue.
It was difficult for courts in these cases to see how a mark owner deserved relief when it
arguably was engaging in the same type of deception as the accused infringer. It was also
difficult to see how the defendant's use diverted consumers who otherwise would have gone
to the mark owner when the mark owner was not, in fact, the source of the products. For this
reason, licensing traditionally was forbidden. See McKenna, supra note 37, at 1893-95.
52. Courts did something very similar to legitimate licensing practices. In order to
distinguish uses by affiliated companies from infringing uses by third parties, courts began to
hold that, even when it did not actually produce the products bearing its mark, a mark owner
could be considered the legal "source" of those products if it exercised sufficient control
over their quality. See, e.g., Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Son, Inc., 7 F. Supp.
211, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1934) ("An article need not be actually manufactured by the owner of the
trade-mark it being enough that it is manufactured under his supervision and according to his
directions thus securing both the right of the owner and the right of the public."). Congress
later codified this understanding of source in section 5 of the Lanham Act, which provides
that use of a mark by "related companies" inures to the benefit of the mark owner. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1055 (2006). A "related company" in this context is one "whose use of a mark is controlled
by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or
in connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Thus, in modern
terms, the legal source of a product is not necessarily the actual producer of a product but
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Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 5 3 for example, the court held that the
defendant's use of "The Vogue Hat Company" to sell hats infringed Vogue's
rights in the VOGUE mark for magazines because "[the] course of conduct by
the defendant manufacturer and its retailers created a very common alternative
impression-first, that these hats were manufactured by the plaintiff; or,
second, that, although some knew that plaintiff was not manufacturing, yet
these hats were in some way vouched for or sponsored or approved by the
plaintiff."
54
Courts sometimes acknowledged that, by recognizing confusion regarding
sponsorship or affiliation as actionable, they were broadening the scope of
unfair competition law. 55 Yet most appear to have regarded that expansion as
unremarkable; the cases reflect no significant reservations about expanding
trademark law to cover noncompetitive goods. 56 This was, however,
unmistakably a significant change, and it was this change that set in motion the
current crisis.
instead the entity exercising control over the quality of products bearing a particular mark.
That entity might be related to the actual producer only by contract.
53. 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
54. Id. at 511. For reasons not entirely clear to us, many of the early sponsorship or
affiliation cases involved the use of a mark previously known as the title of a magazine. See,
e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948) (finding
defendant's use of "Miss Seventeen Foundations Co." as the partnership name to make and
sell girdles, and "Miss Seventeen" as the trademark for the girdles, infringing of the
magazine publisher's rights: "[T]he defendants' use of 'Seventeen' created a likelihood that
the public would erroneously believe that defendants' dresses were advertised in or
sponsored by the magazine and that the plaintiffs reputation and good will would thereby be
injured."); Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875, 876 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (finding the
defendant's use of Esquire for a bar infringing of the magazine publisher's rights: "The
Court finds from the evidence that the defendant's use of plaintiffs name 'Esquire' is
calculated to, and does, cause the public (not otherwise fully informed) to believe there is
some connection between the two, either that the plaintiff owns or controls the business of
the defendant, or sponsors it, or has given leave to conduct the business under some contract,
and that the defendant's business has the approval of plaintiff, or that the defendant's
business is in some manner related to the plaintiff's business, Esquire, Inc., and thereby
constitutes unfair competition in violation of plaintiffs rights."). Magazine cases remain an
active part of the trademark docket. See, e.g., PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Polo Ass'n,
Inc., 520 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2008); Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 (9th
Cir. 2002); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
55. In Radio Co. of America v. R.C.A. Rubber Corp., for example, the court conceded
that, in a case involving noncompeting goods, "[s]trictly speaking, we are not dealing with
unfair competition, in the usual sense of that term." 114 F. Supp. 162, 164 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
56. Most courts simply assumed that the harm from confusion regarding sponsorship
or affiliation was the same as that caused by confusion regarding actual source. See, e.g.,
Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 167 F.2d at 973 ("[T]he wrong of the defendant consisted in
imposing upon the plaintiff a risk that the defendant's goods would be associated by the
public with the plaintiff, and it can make no difference whether that association is based
upon attributing defendant's goods to plaintiff or to a sponsorship by the latter when it has
been determined that plaintiff had a right to protection of its trade name.").
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III. MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL CONFUSION
As we have seen, the move to prevent confusion as to sponsorship and
affiliation began with cases involving related goods that consumers might
reasonably have assumed the trademark owner actually made. It expanded to
include products that were not made by the trademark owner directly but that
consumers might reasonably have believed the trademark owner stood behind
or guaranteed, and ultimately it extended to include cases in which there was at
most a business relationship between the trademark owner and the product
maker but no belief whatsoever of a relationship between the trademark owner
and the defendant's goods.
We think the concept of sponsorship or affiliation, introduced to
accommodate these broader claims, is to blame for much of what ails modem
trademark law. This is not to say that all of trademark law's expansion beyond
competing products was unjustified. To the contrary, we think, as we explain
further below, that trademark rights ought to extend far enough to cover uses
that confuse consumers about who is ultimately responsible for the quality of
the defendant's goods or services. Some of those cases will be situations where
consumers may not believe the plaintiff actually produced the goods or services
at issue but nevertheless believe the plaintiff has played a role in guaranteeing
quality. But "sponsorship" or "affiliation" could refer to virtually any
relationship between the parties, 57 and we believe it is precisely the vagueness
of these terms that has led to the problems we described in the Introduction.
Confusion about some relationships simply shouldn't matter because it doesn't
affect consumers' decisions to purchase the defendant's goods or services. Yet
the "sponsorship or affiliation" formulation allows for no such distinctions,
threatening ultimately to swallow up all uses of another's mark.
We therefore propose to do away with the "sponsorship or affiliation"
terminology altogether and to reframe the trademark infringement question in
terms of whether the defendant's use is likely to confuse consumers about who
is responsible for the quality of the defendant's goods or services. Uses that
cause such confusion should be deemed trademark infringement; those that
cause confusion regarding other types of relationships should be dealt with, if
at all, through something analogous to a false advertising claim.
57. Courts have made little attempt to give greater content to "sponsorship" or
"affiliation." See Adolph Kastor & Bros. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 138 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir.
1943) ("At the outset we hold therefore that the word, 'Scout,' when applied to a boy's
pocket knife, suggests, if indeed it does not actually indicate, that the knife is in some way
sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America." (emphasis added)); Copacabana, Inc. v.
Breslauer, 101 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 467, 468 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1954) (rejecting application to
register Copacabana for cosmetics in light of prior use of Copacabana for nightclub and
restaurant despite finding that cosmetics are "entirely different" from the nightclub and
restaurant because customers may assume that the cologne was "made by, sponsored by, or
in some way connected with" Copacabana, Inc. (emphasis added)).
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A. Justifications for Expanding Confusion
At the core of trademark infringement are, and always have been, cases in
which consumers are confused about who actually produced and/or is offering
the defendant's product or service-confused, that is, about the actual source of
the defendant's products or services. These are most frequently cases in which
the plaintiff and defendant sell the same type of goods, but this category now
might also include cases in which the defendant sells goods closely related to
those of the plaintiff-cases like Borden. Somewhat further afield, but in our
view still justifiably included within trademark infringement, are cases in
which consumers are likely to think not that the plaintiff actually supplied the
defendant's products or services, but that the plaintiff somehow guarantees
their quality. The clearest example involves franchising. Franchisors often do
not themselves make the products sold under their brands, and we suspect that a
significant portion of the public understands as much. But consumers
nevertheless understand the franchisors to stand behind the products sold by its
franchisees, and we think it is reasonable for them to do so. It is reasonable for
a consumer to assume that the Baskin-Robbins ice cream cone they have today
in Denver will be similar to the one they had last week in Seattle, and that if it
isn't, it is the national company, not the Denver producer, who is ultimately to
blame.
58
In both of these cases-those in which consumers actually believe that the
plaintiff produced the defendant's goods and those in which consumers
understand that the plaintiff did not produce the goods but nevertheless believe
the plaintiff assures their quality--consumers derive important information
from the defendant's use of the mark, and failure to regulate such uses would
have serious negative consequences in the commercial marketplace. If Borden
sells ice cream, but not other milk products, the use by a defendant of the
Borden mark on, say, condensed milk won't actually cause Borden's to lose a
sale; they don't sell condensed milk. 59 But it is quite plausible that consumers
will assume the Borden's that makes condensed milk is the same Borden's that
makes ice cream.
Two arguments conventionally have been used to support the view that
trademark law should prevent parties from creating such misimpressions. First
is a quality feedback argument: Borden's (the condensed milk company) will
be harmed if consumers attribute the ice cream to it and the ice cream turns out
58. Indeed, that assumption is so strong that one commentator has argued that the
trademark owner should bear responsibility for torts committed by the franchisee. Lynn M.
LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1099, 1099
(2002). LoPucki reasons that consumers attribute local franchisee behavior to the national
chain, and since the chain intentionally benefits from that attribution, it should also bear the
costs of that relationship. Id.
59. This was the conclusion of the court a century ago in denying the trademark owner
relief. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir.
1912). That case undoubtedly would come out differently today, however.
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not to meet the consumers' quality expectations.60 Second is the claim that
consumers will be harmed because their belief that the same company stands
behind both products might have induced some to purchase the ice cream
expecting something more than they received.
We think the evidence supporting the first argument is pretty
underwhelming. 6 1 Producers simply aren't likely to be harmed directly by
noncompetitive uses except in unusual circumstances. Consumers, on the other
hand, do have strong interests at stake in at least some noncompeting-goods
cases.
1. Consumers, producers, and the quality of unrelated goods
Research regarding brand extensions suggests, somewhat surprisingly (to
us, at least), that producers aren't often harmed by consumers' mistaken
association of unrelated products with them. 62 Specifically, the research
suggests that consumers generally do not alter their global evaluations of
brands (i.e., their assessments of the brand's quality) when they encounter
negative information about related products offered under the same mark.6 3
60. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:15 (4th ed. 2009) ("If, for example, the infringer's V-8 vitamin pills make
the purchaser's child sick, she may well carry over an unfavorable reaction to plaintiff's V-8
vegetable juice."). A related argument focuses on the mark owner's control over its
reputation, regardless of the current quality of the third party's goods or services. See, e.g.,
Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir.
1983) ("Courts readily find irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases because of the
victim's inability to control the nature and quality of the infringer's goods, not because the
infringer's goods are necessarily inferior. Even if the infringer's goods are of high quality,
the victim has the right to insist that its reputation not be imperiled by another's actions."
(citations omitted)).
61. For a detailed discussion of the relevant marketing literature, see Mark P.
McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63 (2009).
62. Brand extension refers to the practice of introducing new products under existing
brands. Some researchers distinguish between brand extensions and line extensions. In this
terminology, new products introduced in the same basic-level category as the parent brand
would be line extensions, and new products in different basic-level categories would be
brand extensions. Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When
Do Brand Extensions Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. MARKETING 71, 74 n.3 (1993). The
"basic" level is the one most easily recognized and discriminated by consumers. Id. at 74.
Thus, the basic level category for Coca-Cola might be "soda." A line extension then would
be a new type of soda offered under the Coca-Cola mark, such as Diet Coke. A brand
extension would involve introduction of a new juice product under the Coca-Cola mark.
Brand extensions, in this terminology, would thus be more remote from the original products
than would line extensions. We use "brand extension" generally to refer to both practices.
63. In one study by Jean Romeo, for example, negative information about a brand
extension had no significant negative effect on subjects' evaluations of the family brand as
compared to their evaluations of the brand before learning about the extension. In fact, the
only significant effect Romeo found was the positive effect negative information about an
extension in a dissimilar product category (sherbert as an extension of Tropicana juice) had
on the family brand. Jean B. Romeo, The Effect of Negative Information on the Evaluations
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They may think badly of the related products, but that negative view generally
doesn't alter the positive view they had of the core product. 64 Indeed the only
studies that show any feedback effects involve products that are extremely
closely related-such as toothbrushes and toothpaste-and which are explicitly
tied together in the market. 65 Consumers, in other words, are smart enough to
distinguish different products and hold different impressions of them. 66
Importantly, even in those few cases where negative information impacts
brand image, it does so only in an abstract sense. Negative information about
an extension appears not to impact consumers' assessments of the parent brand
in the context of the goods the parent previously offered. Thus, for example,
Joseph Chang found that both of two unfavorable extensions (Sprite orangeades
and Sprite dish-washing detergent) affected consumers' attitudes towards the
overall Sprite brand. 6 ' At the same time, however, neither unfavorable
extension diluted the image of the original brand of Sprite lemonades. 6s Thus,
of Brand Extensions and the Family Brand, 18 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 399, 404-05
(1991). Kevin Keller and David Aaker similarly failed to find any difference between the
core brand evaluations of subjects who received negative information about an extension and
a control group that had not received any extension information. See Kevin Lane Keller &
David A. Aaker, The Effects of Sequential Introduction of Brand Extensions, 29 J.
MARKETING RES. 35, 43, 46 (1992). In Keller and Aaker's terminology, a "core" brand refers
to the original brand in its original context.
64. The situation is somewhat more complicated with respect to multiple or successive
extensions, but the lesson is largely the same: extension information is unlikely to affect
global assessments of a core brand. In Keller and Aaker's study, successful brand extensions
increased evaluations of later extensions and of the core brand itself, at least when the core
brand was of average quality. Keller & Aaker, supra note 63, at 46. Unsuccessful
intervening extensions led to lower evaluations of later proposed extensions, but they did not
affect evaluations of the core brand, regardless of the core brand's quality level. Id. Thus, the
only apparent risk to a core brand from failed extension is that consumers will evaluate
future extensions more negatively than they otherwise might have. Moreover, subjects
tended to find the core brand owner equally credible even after receiving information about a
brand extension they regarded as a bad fit. Id. at 46-47.
65. See Tiilin Erdem, An Empirical Analysis of Umbrella Branding, 35 J. MARKETING
RES. 339, 347 (1998) (finding that variance in the quality of toothbrushes given away as free
samples from the owner of a known toothpaste brand had some cross-category effects (i.e.,
consumers updated their quality expectations of the toothpaste and bought less of it), but that
those effects were "small in magnitude"). Erdem's study relied on purchase data after
exposure to free toothbrush samples provided explicitly by the brand owner. Id. at 345. Thus,
not only was there no doubt regarding the source of the toothbrushes, the brand owner
aggressively tied the two products together. It is not clear whether the same results would
have ensued if consumers had found the similarly branded toothbrushes on their own.
66. Cf Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks,
Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575 (2008) (finding
that consumers are more sophisticated about purchasing decisions than trademark law
generally assumes).
67. Joseph W. Chang, Will a Family Brand Image Be Diluted by an Unfavorable
Brand Extension? A Brand Trial-Based Approach, 29 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 299,
302 (2002). Dish-washing detergent? Sprite? No, we don't know what they were thinking
either.
68. Id. Positive evaluations of Sprite orangeades, on the other hand, enhanced
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the impact of unfavorable extensions is much more hypothetical and contingent
than immediate or certain.
Extension information is also unlikely to negatively impact specific brand
beliefs, even when the extension is incongruent with those brand beliefs.69
After reviewing the relevant literature to distill "main tendencies," Henrik
Sjbdin and Fredrik T6m concluded that negative evaluation of incongruent
extension information will not affect evaluation of the parent brand.
70
Moreover, any impact an extension has on specific brand beliefs is likely
limited to the parent brand generally; just as with global brand beliefs, an
extension has little or no impact on the brand in the context of particular
products. Thus, even if an extension affects consumers' general view of the
Neutrogena brand as "mild," it is unlikely to affect their belief that Neutrogena
hand lotion is mild. Moreover, any such effect on consumers' specific brand
beliefs is unlikely to matter because evaluations of specific brand beliefs
generally don't impact consumers' decisions: consumers evaluating a new
product tend to rely on global attitudes towards a brand rather than attempting
to recall and process specific brand attributes. 71
Combined with the evidence we reported earlier regarding unsuccessful
brand extensions, this may mean that companies that are perceived as having
failed at brand extension in the past will get less of a brand boost for future
consumers' attitudes towards Sprite lemonades.
69. Incongruity here refers to use of the brand for products that do not fit with one or
more specific brand associations. Use of Neutrogena for sandpaper, for example, would be
incongruous with the belief that Neutrogena is "mild." See Helge Thorbjornsen, Brand
Extensions: Brand Concept Congruency and Feedback Effects Revisited, 14 J. PRODUCT &
BRAND MGMT. 250, 250-51 (2005); see also Henrik Sjbdin & Fredrik T6m, When
Communication Challenges Brand Associations: A Framework for Understanding Consumer
Responses to Brand Image Incongruity, 5 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 32, 38 (2006).
70. Sj6din & Thrn, supra note 69, at 38. The authors explain this somewhat
counterintuitive result by suggesting consumers generally use a sub-typing strategy to
resolve incongruous information. Id. That is, when a brand extension is atypical, consumers
are likely to resolve the incongruity by storing the information about the extension in a
separate cognitive category. When consumers create such sub-types, the parent brand is
effectively insulated from feedback. Id. But whatever the explanation, the conclusion that
incongruous information will not affect consumer brand beliefs is consistent with other
research demonstrating that well-known brands are quite resistant to change. See Stephen J.
Hoch, Product Experience Is Seductive, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 448, 451 (2002) ("Using a
simple associative learning procedure, [van Osselaer and Alba] showed that, in a few trials,
people learn brand associations that later block the learning of new predictive attribute
associations."); Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures
for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 274 (2000) ("It appears that
very strong brands are immune to dilution because their memory connections are so strong
that it is difficult for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the same brand
name.").
71. See Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Customer-Based
Brand Equity for Frequently Purchased Products: Conceptual Framework and Empirical
Results, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 124, 125 (2004); see also Laura R. Bradford, Emotion,
Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1260 (2008).
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extensions, even if they do not suffer a harm in their core market. This is an
injury to a trademark owner only to the extent a foregone benefit constitutes a
harm, and the case that consumers are injured in that circumstance is more
tenuous.
In short, the evidence suggests that producers aren't likely to be harmed in
a direct way by the sale of unrelated products bearing their trademark.72
Certainly producers are not likely to be harmed frequently enough to justify a
rule that assumes harm whenever there is confusion in a case involving
noncompeting goods. The only plausible case of injury involves likely entry
into a market using the same brand.
2. Uses that confuse consumers about quality
Despite the lack of a compelling producer interest in trademark protection
against noncompeting goods, we think consumers have a strong interest in
protection when the defendant's use of a mark suggests the plaintiff controls
the quality of the defendant's products or services. The ability to rely on
statements of quality is critical to consumers' ability to evaluate products or
services. In cases of this sort, consumers are getting real information that
affects their decisions about which products or services to buy. In the
franchising context, for example, even if consumers understand that
McDonald's Corporation is not the actual source of their hamburgers,
trademark enforcement allows consumers to connect the McDonald's brand
name to product quality by modulating the reputation of the company
ultimately responsible for controlling the quality of those hamburgers. 73
Likewise, consumers are likely to derive important information from use of the
APPLE mark in conjunction with the iPhone, information that affects their
evaluation of the quality of the iPhone.
Consequently, even if the harm to mark owners in the context of
noncompeting goods is uncertain, quality-related messages are important
72. A different argument that producers are harmed by uses of the same mark for
noncompetitive goods might focus on the costs the producer would be required to incur in
re-educating consumers about the quality of its goods if and when it entered the same market
as the junior user. If, for example, Borden was unable to prevent another company from
using the Borden name for ice cream and was forced to enter the ice cream market under a
different name (since the other company would have established priority in the ice cream
market), Borden would have to educate consumers about the quality of its new ice cream
product instead of being able to rely on use of the Borden name to transfer quality messages
to the new products. We think that our focus on uses that indicate control over quality covers
those cases in which the quality information would transfer to the new product.
73. On the organizational choices associated with franchise relationships, see, for
example, James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The
Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 403-07 (1987); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the
Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978); Mira
Wilkins, The Neglected Intangible Asset: The Influence of the Trade Mark on the Rise of the
Modern Corporation, 34 Bus. HIST. 66, 87-88 (1992).
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enough to consumers' ability to evaluate products or services that uses of a
mark that cause confusion about responsibility for quality ought to be
actionable as trademark infringement. 74 Moreover, we think confusion about
responsibility for quality affects buying decisions frequently enough that such
confusion ought to be actionable without any need for evidence of impact on
consumers' decision making. In other words, confusion regarding responsibility
for quality ought to be presumed material.
Even here, it is worth distinguishing between cases in which consumers
really will be confused about who is responsible for quality despite the
unrelated character of the goods and cases in which differences between the
goods or the brand may dispel any such confusion. And it bears emphasizing
that confusion is to be judged not based on abstract notions of similarity but in
the context in which consumers actually see the goods or services. For
example, producers often distinguish their goods with a house mark, a product-
specific brand, a logo, a slogan, product packaging, and perhaps product color
or configuration all at once. 75 Confusion is less likely in the case of unrelated
goods when a defendant copies only one (or a few) of these elements rather
than all of them. 76 And brand owners are even less likely to be harmed by any
confusion that does arise when there are other branding elements by which
consumers can differentiate the parties' products or services: several studies
have concluded that differentiating an extension product from the parent brand
by adding to or altering the stimulus is effective in preventing any feedback
effects on the parent brand. So, for example, use of a sub-brand name such as
"Ultra by BMW" was sufficient to protect the BMW parent brand from any
reputational harm that might otherwise have arisen from consumers' negative
perceptions of a lower-priced model offered under that name. 77
74. See, e.g., Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat'l Distrib. Co., 520 F.3d
393 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding misrepresentations by distributor as to nature of relationship
with franchisor sufficient to state a Lanham Act claim).
75. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1992). That case involved a lawsuit by makers of "Excedrin PM" nighttime pain reliever
against makers of "Tylenol PM" nighttime pain reliever. The court separately analyzed the
house brands ("Excedrin" vs. "Tylenol"), the mark "PM," the color of the lettering, and the
color of the packaging; the pills themselves were also differently colored. Id. at 1039-46.
The court found no confusion because of the prominence of and difference between
"Excedrin" and "Tylenol," despite the similarity of the trade dress and the identity of the
"PM" marks. Id. at 1047.
76. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 189, 251-52 (2006) (making this point in the context of
slogans); see also George Miaoulis & Nancy D'Amato, Consumer Confusion and
Trademark Infringement, 42 J. MARKETING 48, 54 (1978) (finding, in the context of
competing goods, that the primary cue for association between two brands was not the name
but the visual appearance).
77. See Amna Kirmani, Sanjay Sood & Sheri Bridges, The Ownership Effect in
Consumer Responses to Brand Line Stretches, 63 J. MARKETING 88, 94-95 (1999) (finding
that sub-branding was sufficient to insulate the BMW and Acura brands from any negative
feedback); see also Sandra J. Milberg, C. Whan Park & Michael S. McCarthy, Managing
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It is also worth emphasizing that consumer, rather than producer, interests
are driving protection in cases of confusion regarding responsibility for quality.
Producers serve as an imperfect proxy for consumers here because they are
motivated to sue in ways that consumers aren't. 78 But the fact that it is
consumers we are primarily protecting in these cases means that trademark law
should eschew rules that undermine consumer quality expectations. For
example, producers that are nominally protecting consumer interests in quality
should not be able to undermine those interests by licensing their mark without
quality control.79 Indeed, whatever the justifications for the general rules
against assignments of trademarks "in gross" and naked licensing, those rules
seem to have particular force here. We think, in fact, it is a significant virtue of
focusing trademark infringement on responsibility for quality that it would
harmonize the infringement standard with the requirement that licensors
exercise quality control in order to claim the benefits of licensed uses.
8 1
3. Consumer perceptions in pure sponsorship cases
In contrast to the types of uses we put in the trademark infringement
category, consumers get no quality-related information from the defendant's
use of a mark in cases that involve confusion about other types of relationships
that might exist between the plaintiff and defendant. Consumers, for example,
might believe the presence of Coca-Cola cups in front of the American Idol
hosts suggests some kind of product placement agreement between Coca-Cola
Negative Feedback Effects Associated with Brand Extensions: The Impact of Alternative
Branding Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 119 (1997) (finding that sub-branding may
prevent negatively evaluated extensions from harming the parent brand).
78. Cf Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1992) (arguing
that "competitors' incentives to sue are not correlated with the likelihood of consumer
harm"); Ross D. Petty, Supplanting Government Regulation with Competitor Lawsuits: The
Case of Controlling False Advertising, 25 IND. L. REv. 351 (1991).
79. But see Irene Calboli, The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern Trademark
Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 341 (2007) (arguing that trademark owners should not be
required to control the quality of their licensed products).
80. Compare Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment "With Goodwill": A Concept
Whose Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2005), Irene Calboli, What If After All,
Trademarks Were "Traded in Gross"?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 345, and Allison Sell
McDade, Trading in Trademarks: Why the Anti-Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should Be
Abolished when Trademarks Are Used as Collateral, 77 TEX. L. REv. 465 (1998) (all
arguing in favor of unrestricted licensing and sale of trademarks), with Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1709-10 (1999)
(defending the rule against naked licensing).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006) (providing that use of a mark by "related companies"
inures to the benefit of the mark owner). A "related company" in this context is one "whose
use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of




and the producers of American Idol, but no reasonable person thinks Coke
controls the quality of the American Idol television show. 
82
This is not to deny that consumers obtain some kind of information from
these uses regarding the brands' personalities. Consumers may, for example,
learn about the image Coca-Cola is trying to project through its association
with a popular show (and probably about the target audience of American Idol
through its association with Coke). The fact that consumers can use brand
relationships to build such image connections might be thought to benefit them,
though even that is open to debate. But this image-related information is
qualitatively different than the information consumers derive from quality-
related messages, and we believe the benefits from protecting such information
are lower and the costs of protecting it are higher. 83
On the benefits side, it seems clear to us that the producer-harm arguments
for claims in the context of these other relationships are particularly weak. The
marketing literature dealing with brand alliances is instructive here. Brand
alliances, as defined in this literature, are "partnership[s] between two entities
in which efforts are combined for a common interest or to achieve a particular
aim." 84 These partnerships can take many forms, but the two most common
forms are joint promotions (McDonald's using Kung Fu Panda toys in its
Happy Meals) and co-branding arrangements (Edy's® Loaded Cookie Dough
Ice Cream with Nestle Toll House® cookie dough). The lesson of this literature
is clear, if somewhat counter-intuitive: "consumers do not routinely blame a
host brand for its partner's mistakes."
85
82. Perhaps we're wrong about this and consumers, increasingly familiar with product
placement and other complicated arrangements between advertisers and content creators, do
in fact derive quality-related information from the presence of Coca-Cola cups. Economists
have argued that the fact that a company is willing to spend money advertising is itself a
signal of quality. See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 730
(1974); I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38
J.L. & ECON. 207 (1995). One of us has elsewhere explained the self-limiting nature of this
claim. Lemley, supra note 80, at 1692. But even if consumers assume that Coke guarantees
the quality of American Idol, the general point holds: many of the kinds of uses that
currently give rise to sponsorship or affiliation claims convey qualitatively different kinds of
information than those that suggest responsibility for quality. And our formulation doesn't
require guessing about whether a particular use conveys quality-related information-the
plaintiff always has the opportunity to prove it.
83. Nonetheless, some courts have concluded that the fact of assumed permission is
itself an actionable trademark harm. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544
(5th Cir. 1998) ("For a party to suggest to the public, through its use of another's mark or a
similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its goods or services
suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party's product or service and is a kind of
confusion the Lanham Act prohibits."). In that case, the evidence of endorsement was merely
based on similarity of the golf course layouts, and was not based on any affirmative
representation by the defendant.
84. Nicole L. Votolato & H. Rao Unnava, Spillover of Negative Information on Brand
Alliances, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 196, 196 (2006).
85. Id. at 198.
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In one significant study, the authors focused on the consequences to a
clothing company of negative information about its supplier and a celebrity
endorser of the clothing company's products. 86 More specifically, the authors
attempted to measure the change in consumers' attitudes toward the fictitious
clothing company (the host brand) from information that the company's
partners had behaved immorally or had been incompetent. 87 There wasn't any.
Putting their finding in context with other research on brand associations, the
authors concluded that negative information does not have any feedback effect
on the partner absent some additional information about the partner's
culpability for the failing, regardless of whether the information relates to
competence or moral failings and regardless of whether the information is
about another company or a person with which the partner is associated. As the
authors noted,
[A] host brand may generally be quite impervious to negative publicity
surrounding its partner brand; the host brand was only affected [in the study]
when participants were led to believe that the host knew of and condoned the
partner's behavior. Spillover from the partner brand to the host brand did not
occur unless this condition was present. 88
Recall that this finding comes from a study in which respondents were told
explicitly that the host brand had relationships with the partners about which
the negative information was provided. Thus, there was no ambiguity about
affiliation-respondents understood that the host brand was affiliated with the
partners. What this suggests is that there is unlikely to be any negative feedback
absent some information-additional information, beyond the mere fact of
association--demonstrating the host brand's specific culpability. In other
words, consumers generally do not impute responsibility based solely on the
fact of association. The important implication here is that consumers generally
do not view alliance relationships themselves as indicative of a partner's
control.
These studies suggest that any harm to producers from confusion about
sponsorship or affiliation is quite attenuated: producers suffer no lost sales, and
they are unlikely to suffer any reputational consequences absent additional
86. Id.
87. Previous research suggested to the authors that consumers might react differently to
different types of negative information-information about competence, on the one hand,
and moral misdeeds on the other. See id. at 197; see also Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin,
The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses,
61 J. MARKETING 68 (1997); Bogdan Wojciszke, Hanna Brycz & Peter Borkenau, Effects of
Information Content and Evaluative Extremity on Positivity and Negativity Biases, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 327 (1993). Specifically, this earlier research suggested that
consumers react more negatively to competence-based information than moral failures when
the target of the information is a company; just the reverse is true when the target of the
information is a person. See Votolato & Unnava, supra note 84, at 197.
88. Votolato & Unnava, supra note 84, at 201 (emphasis added). These findings, as the




information suggesting control over the partner. If a mall cookie vendor
advertises that its cookies contain M&Ms, for example, consumers might or
might not assume that Mars had entered into a deal with the cookie company,
but whether they do or not they are unlikely to blame Mars if they don't like the
cookies. The only sense, then, in which a mark owner is harmed by third-party
uses that suggest sponsorship or affiliation is that third-party uses might
interfere with the mark owner's own ability to develop and derive value from
such relationships. In other words, the only likely loss to trademark owners
from affiliation confusion is the loss of revenue the trademark owner could
have made by licensing the mark to the putative affiliate. This is a claim to
market control, not a claim of harm resulting from confusion or even an injury
to consumers at all.89 We think this circular claim to licensing revenue is
insufficient to justify trademark protection, particularly in light of the
significant costs such protection entails. 9
0
The marketing literature has implications for the merchandising right as
well. Merchandising cases involve the use of brands not to identify the source
or quality of goods, but instead as desirable products in and of themselves. The
sale of brands qua brands on T-shirts, hats, and the like presents difficult
problems for trademark theory.91 There is no obvious source relationship
between, say, a university or a professional sports team and T-shirts or hats that
feature the logo of that university or team. There might be a presumed
franchising-type quality relationship; universities and sports teams today do
license the manufacturing of clothing featuring their logos, and it is possible
that consumers both assume that the mark owner is serving as a guarantor of
the quality of those clothes and that any clothing featuring the school or team
name is in fact licensed by the university. On the other hand, those consumer
assumptions will not be present in every case. Outside the school and sports
context, and perhaps a few others (Nike, say), it is not clear to us that
consumers assume that any T-shirt with a trademark on it is necessarily
licensed, much less quality-guaranteed, by the brand owner.
Our point is not that consumers can never be harmed by confusion
89. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 24:9 (discussing the circularity problem that
occurs when consumer perception drives licensing law but licensing law drives consumer
perception); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 907-27 (2007). For criticism of property-based market allocation claims
in IP more generally, see, for example, Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless
Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031 (2005).
90. We evaluate such claims in more detail in a separate paper. See Mark McKenna &
Mark A. Lemley, Owning Markets?: Trademark Law and Market Foreclosure (working
paper 2010).
91. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 754-58 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (detailing these cases and analyzing them
under trademark principles); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 471-89 (2005) (same).
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regarding non-quality-related relationships. Rather, the point is that the sort of
attenuated confusion at issue in sponsorship and affiliation cases does not
necessarily or even often harm consumers or the market for quality products.
The benefits of expanding confusion law to this class of cases are
correspondingly smaller.
B. Costs of Expanding Confusion
If the benefits of treating sponsorship or affiliation confusion as infringing
are low, the costs of that protection are high. We see at least four potential
types of costs to extending trademark rights to cover any perceived relationship
unrelated to the quality guarantee.
First, the expansion of trademark infringement to include any claim of
affiliation or relationship necessarily expands the rights of all mark owners
beyond the goods and geographic regions in which they sell or into which they
are likely to expand. As a result, it produces any number of conflicts between
legitimate mark owners that have coexisted for years under traditional
trademark rules but who cannot share a mark without some risk that someone
will think the identity of the marks implies that they are somehow related or
affiliated. Dell the bookseller predates Dell the computer company,92 but if the
lack of relationship between the products is no longer to matter-as it
increasingly doesn't under the broad form of sponsorship or affiliation
confusion-then whether those two marks should be allowed to coexist will
depend on what a court concludes about the percentage of people who think
they are related. The same is true of United the airline company and United the
moving company, of Apple the computer and electronics company and Apple
the travel agency, and thousands of others. 9 3 Whether or not the trademark
owners will sue in these cases (and it is far from clear which would sue the
other), the fact is that consumers are likely just as "confused" in these cases as
in the ones in which they do sue. Taking mark similarity in different markets to
imply sponsorship or affiliation, as many courts have done, means that only one
company should be allowed to use any given mark (or indeed any term too
close to that mark). Either we should be awash in lawsuits, or we are not really
taking seriously the idea that confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation matters.
Second, and related, is the problem of coddling consumers. Consumers are
pretty good in most circumstances at figuring out what they want to buy. 94 But
92. Bantam Dell, the book publisher, was established in 1945. Bantam Dell Publishing
Group, Publishers' Catalogues, http://www.lights.ca/publisher/db/8/1628.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2009). Michael Dell founded PC's Limited in 1984 and the company changed its
name to Dell Computer Corporation in 1988. Dell, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dell (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
93. Dilution law raises similar problems, but dilution protection is, at least in theory,
available only to truly famous marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
94. For a detailed discussion of the evidence on all sides, see Lee et al., supra note 66;
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their perceptions are shaped by the environment in which they find themselves.
If they see trademarks that overlap, they will adapt and deal with that
environment. And as long as legal claims remain available against explicitly
misleading statements-e.g., "Coca-Cola is the official sponsor of American
Idor'-there is every reason to believe that consumers will be able to do so
relatively easily. 95 But if they become used to a world in which only one
company has a right to refer to a brand for any reason, consumers may well
become confused by uses that would otherwise seem perfectly reasonable.
96
Expanding trademark law to prevent remote prospects of confusion will change
consumer expectations in ways that may make confusion on the basis of remote
connections more likely, which might make still further expansion of trademark
law necessary to stop critics, parodies, or gripe site Web pages from funding
themselves with online ads or selling T-shirts.97 Put another way, unless we are
able to identify more specifically the types of relationships that could give rise
to actionable confusion, there is no logical stopping point for trademark
protection.
To see this point, consider a seemingly extreme example." We think it
utterly uncontroversial for a grocery store to locate generic colas on a shelf next
to Coca-Cola. But why? One could say, perhaps, that such uses do not confuse
consumers into thinking that Coke licenses the placement or sponsors the
generic colas. But if the placement does not confuse consumers about Coke's
relationship with the generic colas, it is only because the law has long permitted
the practice, and so consumers accept and understand it. That is not an
inevitable result, however. After all, cola companies do pay for the placement
of their products on store shelves-they just pay grocery stores rather than
mark owners. Had the courts said at the outset that trademark owners could sue
to prevent such placement-reasoning that consumers might think that
cf Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005)
(criticizing trademark theorists for making inconsistent assumptions about the sophistication
of consumers).
95. Several studies have determined that use of a sub-brand or other mechanism for
differentiating an extension from the parent brand effectively insulates the parent brand from
any feedback effects. See, e.g., Kirmani et al., supra note 77 (finding sub-brands effective in
preventing negative feedback from extension to parent brand); Milberg et al., supra note 77
(stating that sub-branding may prevent negatively evaluated extensions from harming the
parent brand). This research suggests that consumers are relatively adept at recognizing
attempts to differentiate, and that they are able to categorize brand attitudes finely when they
have reason to differentiate. Thus, any risk of confusion is attenuated to the extent the uses
entail signals of differentiation.
96. The media often contributes to this problem. See, e.g., Cieply, supra note 34
(accepting without question that "approval [from MLB] is crucial in a baseball film that
intends to use protected trademarks").
97. See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1,
41-42 (2008).
98. This paragraph and the paragraph that follows are adapted from Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1669, 1694-95 (2007).
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proximity implied association, as evidenced by the fact that the generic sellers
pay for shelf placement-grocery stores might well have had to separate like
products to avoid any risk of confusion. Further, even if a finding of confusion
seemed unlikely, many companies would have agreed to change their behavior
or take a license rather than pay to litigate a case all the way to trial and risk
losing. This, in turn, would mean that consumers would not have gotten used to
seeing all the colas grouped together and would make it harder for anyone else
to arrange their shelves this way because, over time, the placement of generic
cola beside Coke would be more surprising to consumers. And if no one else is
putting generic colas next to Coke, it is an easy mental step to conclude that a
grocer that does so is free riding on Coke's interest in being insulated from
nearby competitors, particularly if the grocer is making money directly or
indirectly from the placement or sales of generic colas. 
9 9
Arguably, something similar has already happened with T-shirts bearing
university and sports logos. A use that originally confused no one came, over
time, to confuse consumers as a few courts held that such uses were illegal. '
0 0
These rulings led to widespread licensing, which made consumers assume that
such T-shirts came only from licensed vendors. 101 As a result, it may be that
today the law must enforce the claims of universities and sports teams to be the
only ones to sell merchandise bearing the team logos, though that conclusion is
certainly contested. 102 But if it must, it is not because doing so was the only
way to prevent confusion. It is the law itself that will have created that
confusion.
Third, sponsorship and affiliation cases may be more likely to reach the
wrong result than other types of trademark infringement cases. Courts have
developed multifactor likelihood of confusion tests to identify the
circumstances in which plaintiffs should win trademark cases. 10 3 But those
tests were designed to deal with cases like Borden in which consumers might
believe that the plaintiff is responsible for quality, and few of the factors make
much sense when the issue is confusion about some unspecified sponsorship or
affiliation relationship. 104 Factors such as marketing channels, likelihood of
99. For a more detailed analysis of the retailer issue and an argument that Internet
intermediaries play the same role as retailers for trademark purposes, see Eric Goldman,
Brand Spillovers, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2009).
100. Not all courts have held similarly-some even seemed to reject the claim on the
ground the alleged confusion was not material. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion
Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1983) ("There is no evidence that the
consumer cares who has made the soft goods or whether they were made under license.").
101. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 91, at 472-75 (detailing this history).
102. Id. at 472-78.
103. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979);
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
104. See, e.g., King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084,
1090 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[I1n the rare, pure sponsorship action, other factors [than
similarity]-such as the relation in use and the manner of marketing between the goods or
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expansion, and even consumer sophistication have little relevance to evaluating
Coke's claim to be the exclusive soft drink associated in the minds of
consumers with American Idol. The result is that more and more attention is
focused on factors-notably the court's assessment of the defendant's intent
and survey evidence-that are quite malleable and may tend to shift with the
quality of the lawyers or experts arguing rather than the strength of the case. 105
In Balducci, for instance, the court's (unsupportable) conclusion that a parody
of a Michelob ad was infringing was driven by spurious survey evidence; in
that case, the survey asked a question (whether the defendant should have to get
permission to publish the parody) that misstated the law. 106
Barton Beebe's work has shown that courts tend to fall back on their
assessment of a defendant's intent in deciding whether consumer confusion is
likely. 107 Perhaps this is acceptable if the intent in question is intent to confuse
consumers into buying the defendant's goods instead of the plaintiffs. But
when the relevant intent is more amorphous-some sort of free riding-the fact
that courts rely so heavily on intent becomes problematic because the concept
of free riding is ultimately empty.1 08 In the end, it may be that trademark law
has worked out a set of rules that effectively distinguish confusing from non-
confusing uses in the run-of-the-mill trademark case. But those rules don't
apply to sponsorship cases, and the factors courts substitute may be more prone
to produce erroneous findings on confusion because the tools don't work well
for determining whether this kind of confusion is likely.
Finally, sponsorship or affiliation confusion claims pose particular risks to
services and the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers-have little
importance.").
105. Barton Beebe's analysis of the case law suggests that we may have this problem
even with true source confusion cases because outcomes tend to be driven by the court's
focus on intent. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006). If causation in fact runs in the direction this
suggests, all of trademark infringement analysis may be fundamentally flawed.
106. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994)
(bolstering its finding that confusion was likely by citing the results of a survey showing
over half of the respondents thought Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch's approval to publish
the ad). Unfortunately, that case is not the only one in which a court accepted this sort of
evidence. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, No. 4:08cv0358 TCM, 2008
WL 4619702, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2008) (enjoining a dog toy labeled "Buttwiper"
because a survey showed that 30.3% of consumers "mistakenly believed that VIP's
'Buttwiper' [was] manufactured and marketed by, or with the approval of, [Anheuser-Busch]
or that there [was] some affiliation between 'Buttwiper' and [Anheuser-Busch]"). But see
NFL Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (rejecting
surveys of this sort as calling for a legal conclusion); Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 96 Civ. 5787 (BSJ), 1996 WL 497018, at *6 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1996)
(discounting some of the survey's conclusions because of "serious flaws in the questions").
107. Beebe, supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.)
(rejecting sponsorship dilution claim because "in that attenuated sense of free riding, almost
everyone in business is free riding").
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free expression. Many of the examples we discussed in Part I involve not the
sale of commercial products but the use of a mark as part of protected speech
on issues of social relevance. 109 This should be no surprise because, with the
importance of brand image in today's economy, trademarks "form an important
part of the public dialog on economic and social issues."
1 10
No one can talk about Barbie dolls and the role they play in popular culture
without using the term "Barbie," and often the dolls themselves. Nor can they
effectively make fun of trademark owners without using their marks.111 And as
many commentators have noted, modem expression frequently requires the use
of trademarks in their role as social referents, whether or not the product itself
is being discussed directly. 112 Satire or commentary on unrelated political
issues may need to refer to advertisements to make a clear point in a culture in
which advertising is ubiquitous. 113 And iconic brands may be needed for
supportive messages as well; adulation may well prompt imitation (which is,
after all, the sincerest form of flattery). One could hardly go a day in 2008
without encountering an ad for Obama memorabilia, for instance.
Restricting this speech is harmful to society. It is likely also
unconstitutional. 114 And while all aspects of trademark law can pose First
109. See Lemley, supra note 80, at 1711-13 (documenting numerous examples in
addition to the ones we discuss here).
110. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 31:146; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) ("'[T]rademarks offer a particularly
powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners, and thus become an important,
perhaps at times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary."' (quoting Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 195-96)).
111. And some trademark owners undoubtedly deserve to be made fun of.
112. See Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech
Norms, 3 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 528 (1997); Denicola, supra note 110, at 195-96;
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1990); Wilkins, supra note 73, at 87-88;
Steven M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the
Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 599, 601-03 (1998); Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What's Wrong with This Picture? When
the Lanham Act Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 821, 877-78 (1997). There is significant sociological literature on the process by which
consumers "recode" products and brands, imbuing them with independent social significance
in a way frequently not intended by the trademark owner. For a discussion, see Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 125, 140 (1993).
113. In MasterCard International Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee Inc., 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), for example, Ralph Nader used a parody of
the MasterCard "priceless" advertising campaign to attract viewer attention and make a
political point.
114. For constitutional arguments, see generally Denicola, supra note 110; Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law
of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J.
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Amendment threats, we think it is no accident that the worst problems don't
come from traditional suits against the sale of competing products, but rather
from claims that try to stretch the concept of confusion to cover unrelated
parody products or pure speech by using the rubric of sponsorship or
affiliation. 115 Even if those claims don't succeed, the mere fact that the suits
are brought may distort the use of trademarks as cultural referents, changing the
nature of the social conversation about things, 116 as when trademark owners
demand that brands be removed from pictures or movies depicting places in
which they actually appear. 117 As Judge Kozinski has noted, "[m]uch useful
social and commercial discourse w[ill] be all but impossible if speakers [are]
under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they ma[k]e reference to a
person, company or product by using its trademark."" 8
C. Weighing Costs and Benefits
None of the costs we have identified is sufficient, alone or together, to
defeat the rationale for trademark protection generally, or even with respect to
uses that suggest responsibility for quality. Trademark law as a whole has
benefits that far outweigh its costs. But it is significant-and not
conincidental-that the extreme form of the sponsorship theory of confusion
produces the fewest benefits and causes the most harm. Trademark law works
best when it stays close to its traditional core. As trademark doctrine expands
further afield from that core, it imposes more costs on society and accordingly
requires more justification. 119 But as we have seen, many of those expansions
have less benefit, not more.
What we need, then, is balance. Trademark law must extend beyond pure
147, 171-78 (1998); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark
Law, 61 SMUL. REV. 381,417, 424 (2008).
115. Trademark law incorporates a variety of "defenses" that attempt to soften its
impact on First Amendment interests, but those defenses are somewhat notorious for their
indeterminacy. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 49 (2008) (arguing that while most cases raising these free speech issues have been
decided in favor of speech, "the procedural structure of trademark law's various 'fair use'
doctrines ... generate excessive ambiguity and prolong litigation," thereby "discourag[ing]
speakers from using trademarks expressively in the first place, creating a classic chilling
effect").
116. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 97, at 77-79.
117. See, e.g., "Slumdog Millionaire" Throws Product Placement into Reverse,
VARIETY, Oct. 30, 2008, http://weblogs.variety.com/hal/2008/10/slumdog-million.html
(documenting the efforts to which trademark owners went to have their marks removed from
the background of Slumdog Millionaire).
118. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the First Amendment is implicated by expressive, rather than
commercial, uses of a trademark); Denicola, supra note 110, at 194-96.
119. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1729-30 (1999).
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source confusion in some cases, or it can't effectively serve its purposes. But if
it extends too far, it does more harm than good. In the Parts that follow, we
apply these lessons to trademark doctrine.
IV. DISTINGUISHING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT FROM FALSE
ADVERTISING
We believe that the best way to achieve balance in cases that do not
involve confusion about responsibility for quality is not to try to fit them within
the traditional trademark framework at all, but instead to think of them as akin
to cases of false advertising. False advertising law coexists in the Lanham Act
with trademark law, and both are directed at misrepresentations in the
marketplace. But while trademark law has traditionally aimed at protecting
against the use of the plaintiff's mark to misidentify the source of the
defendant's goods, false advertising law targets a broader range of false or
misleading statements about either the plaintiff, the defendant, or the plaintiffs
or the defendant's goods or services. 
120
False advertising law's broader scope, however, is counterbalanced by
limitations that do not apply in trademark infringement cases. 121 Most notably
for our purposes, while trademark law presumes actionable harm from proof of
consumer confusion, entitling plaintiffs to an injunction, 122 false advertising is
actionable only if the representations made by the defendant materially affect
consumer purchasing decisions. 123 In other words, false or misleading
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 1997). The definition of falsity is itself surprisingly malleable. For
examples, see Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 227, 231-48 (2007).
121. One significant limitation on the scope of false advertising claims is the
requirement that a plaintiff be in competition with the defendant to have standing to assert a
claim. See, e.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l
Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-79 (3d Cir. 1993). For criticism of this rule, see BeVier, supra
note 78.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2006). The Eleventh Circuit has read the Supreme Court
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), to require proof of
irreparable harm and consideration of the balance of hardships before a court can enjoin
infringement. N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11 th Cir.
2008). But we do not think it makes sense, where a plaintiff has proven that the defendant's
use is likely to confuse consumers about actual source or responsibility for quality, to allow
the defendant to keep confusing consumers and only pay damages. Injunctions should almost
always be appropriate in trademark infringement cases as we have defined them.
123. See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302,
315 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting the requirement that the plaintiff prove materiality and that "one
method of establishing materiality involves showing that the false or misleading statement
relates to an inherent quality or characteristic of the product"); Southland Sod Farms, 108
F.3d at 1139 (articulating the elements of a false advertising claim, including the
requirement that "the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing
decision"); Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring proof of materiality); Johnson & Johnson
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statements may or may not cause harm, depending on how people perceive
those statements. Imagine, for example, that the defendant falsely states that the
plaintiff has 11,500 employees, when in fact they have 11,600. The claim is
one of fact, and it is provably false, but it is hard to imagine that the difference
would matter to consumers at all. False advertising law accordingly treats it as
not material. 1
24
We think that logically trademark law can be conceived as a specialized
subset of false advertising law. False advertising law covers a broad range of
misrepresentations, not all of which are actionable. Trademark law focuses on a
subset of these misrepresentations-those that involve use of the plaintiffs
trademark or a simulacrum thereof to brand the defendant's goods. Because of
the centrality of those representations, courts in trademark cases have not
required proof that confusion is material. Rather, they have presumed
materiality.
That presumption makes sense in the context of traditional trademark
infringement: if consumers are confused into thinking the defendant's goods
are the plaintiff's, it is logical to think such confusion will materially affect
consumer purchasing decisions, at least when the confusion arises and is not
dispelled before purchase. 125 We think the same can be said of uses that cause
confusion about responsibility for quality. But the expansion of trademark law
to cover confusion about other types of relationships stretches the general
presumption too far. The types of confusion alleged in the cases we discussed
in Part I may or may not affect consumer purchasing decisions; indeed, for the
reasons we explained in Part II, in most cases we think it unlikely that it will.
The solution, in our view, is simple: not to categorically rule out cases
involving those other forms of confusion, but to limit those claims so as to
increase the benefits of those still actionable and decrease their costs. The
easiest way to do so would be to import into trademark law the materiality
requirement courts have created in the false advertising context and apply it in
any case based on confusion that does not relate to source or control over
v. GAC Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding materiality is presumed if
statements are literally false but must otherwise be proven).
124. See also Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206,
at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (holding that the marking of products with patent numbers
that did not actually cover the products was false but not actionable because it was not
"likely to influence purchasing decisions" of consumers); cf In re Century 21-RE/MAX
Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F. Supp. 915, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that an
overstatement of 25,308 real estate transactions completed in 1992 (out of more than
600,000 transactions) was not likely to influence the purchasing decision of any consumer).
125. We think the doctrines of initial-interest and post-sale confusion can be criticized
on similar grounds: one may reasonably doubt whether either type of confusion, to the extent
it even exists, actually affects purchasing decisions. Cf Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 404-08 (1999) (arguing that post-sale confusion, at least in
the context of prestige goods, is irrelevant). But full analysis of those doctrines is outside the
scope of this Article.
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quality. 12 6 Plaintiffs bringing cases then would face a choice: (1) bring a
trademark infringement claim and be required to prove confusion regarding
actual source or responsibility for the quality of the defendant's goods or
services; or (2) bring a false advertising-type claim alleging that the use causes
some other form of confusion and be required to prove confusion about that
relationship and that such confusion materially affects consumers' decisions
whether to purchase the defendant's goods or services. 127
This formulation has an obvious analogue in antitrust law and its
distinction between conduct deemed per se anticompetitive and conduct judged
according to the rule of reason. Courts in antitrust cases have identified certain
conduct, including conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, or divide markets, as the
type of conduct experience has shown harms competition in most cases. 128
They therefore impose liability whenever a plaintiff shows that the defendant
intentionally engaged in conduct of this type, and the plaintiff does not have to
prove that the defendant's conduct harmed competition. Instead, harm is
conclusively presumed. 129 Conduct with ambiguous effects on competition, on
the other hand, is evaluated by a court more carefully, and plaintiffs alleging
such conduct are required to demonstrate that the conduct at issue in fact harms
126. For suggestions along somewhat similar lines, see, for example, Gibson, supra
note 89, at 949 (suggesting that courts should impose a materiality requirement in
sponsorship or affiliation confusion cases); Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as
Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008). Grynberg would go further than we do,
making materiality an element of every trademark case. While he is undoubtedly correct that
enforcing trademarks can harm non-confused consumers, we think the law strikes the right
balance in presuming materiality from actual confusion as to source or quality.
127. Sometimes the plaintiffs purported injury is neither a lost sale of their own goods
nor confusion about the defendant's goods that materially affects the decision to purchase
the defendant's goods, but instead a claim of injury to the plaintiffs mark based on some
harm other than confusion. These claims fit under the dilution rubric, and we think they fit
neither within the trademark infringement framework nor the false advertising framework,
but instead in their own category. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). Commentators can and do
disagree over how much, if anything, belongs in that category. See Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 91, at 493-95; Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525 (1995); Jerre B. Swann &
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity as
Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994); Rebecca
Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L.
REv. 507 (2008). But analytically the category exists.
128. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004) (identifying collusion for purposes such as price fixing as the "supreme evil
of antitrust"); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (identifying price fixing,
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements as unlawful activities "in and of
themselves").
129. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 ("[T]here are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as




competition. 130 What we propose for trademark law is much the same. True
source confusion and confusion regarding responsibility for quality should be
actionable and should be presumed to materially affect consumers' purchasing
decisions. Other forms of confusion have more ambiguous effects on
consumers, however, and those forms of confusion should only be actionable
when they can be proven material to consumers' decisions in particular
cases. 131
Requiring materiality may also enable courts to tailor relief even when they
find some remediable confusion. Because materiality is a sliding scale, not an
all-or-nothing inquiry, courts could plausibly find some conduct to be material
to purchasing decisions of only a few customers. In false advertising cases, the
strength of the materiality finding is related to the remedy; the more
problematic the deception, the more willing the courts are to act. 132 This makes
sense as a matter of cost-benefit analysis. Thinking about sponsorship cases in
these terms may permit courts to do the same sort of balancing of remedies
here, for example requiring disclaimers as the cure for certain minor types of
trademark harm. 133
One objection to our proposal is that information about sponsorship or
affiliation may be material in some respects to consumer perceptions or to the
trademark owner's reputation without actually having any measurable impact
on consumer purchasing decisions. Trademark owners enter into sponsorship
relationships because they think the goodwill those relationships create will
ultimately translate into purchases made by happy consumers. For example, 7-
11 sponsors the Chicago White Sox, which has agreed to start all its home
games at 7:11 pm. 134 Both parties hope the relationship signals something to
consumers about the brands' personalities and that it impacts consumers'
affective responses to those brands. And while both expect to benefit from the
relationship, it can, at least in theory, work both ways: the linkage between the
two may mean that when the White Sox have a bad year, or if one of their
130. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214-15 (2008).
131. For a similar proposal for differentiating between different types of derivative
works in the copyright context and treating some as presumptively harmful while requiring
proof of harmfulness for others, see Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of
Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317 (2009); see also Christina Bohannan &
Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Errands into the Wilderness (Univ. of Iowa Coll. of
Law, Working Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1377382
(proposing to import the "antitrust injury" doctrine into IP law, though not specifically
trademark law).
132. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 594-601 (2006).
133. Cf Grynberg, supra note 126 (calling for greater attention to the interests of
nonconfused consumers as well as confused ones).
134. White Sox Slurp on Promotion, Will Start Games at 7:11, ESPN, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2621231.
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players takes steroids, 7-1 I's image suffers a bit too. 135 We recognize this
possibility, but we don't think it should deter courts from requiring materiality.
If information relating to brand personality is really important to consumers, it
should be reflected in the final analysis in purchasing decisions. If the
information does not influence purchasing decisions, any harm a trademark
owner might suffer is de minimus, and is likely to be outweighed by the harms
of expanding protection we detailed above. To put it plainly, attempting to
protect these other forms of information through trademark infringement claims
will ultimately eviscerate any meaningful limits on the scope of trademark
rights. We should be extremely confident of real harm in these cases before we
go down that road.
V. WELL, How Do WE WORK THIS?
136
Treating some of the cases currently brought as sponsorship and affiliation
cases as analogous to false advertising claims rather than trademark
infringement claims would not necessarily require a change to the Lanham Act.
Trademark law did not originally extend to sponsorship claims involving
unrelated goods. It was courts, not Congress, that expanded the scope of
trademark law, and courts presumably could undo that expansion.
While the seemingly simple approach would be to treat sponsorship and
affiliation claims as false advertising claims, we can't actually push these
claims into the false advertising system wholesale. The problem is that false
advertising claims require proof that the plaintiff and the defendant are
competitors. 137 Unless it was interpreted extremely broadly, such a
requirement would eliminate sponsorship and affiliation claims, which by
definition involve unrelated goods. Nevertheless, we think the principle of false
advertising-that companies should not deceive consumers in ways that
materially affect their purchasing decisions-applies with full force to implicit
or explicit assertions about sponsorship or affiliation that do not imply
responsibility for quality. Those assertions should be actionable if, but only if,
they (1) are false or misleading and (2) materially affect consumer decisions.
The challenge, then, is to interpret the trademark infringement provisions
of the Lanham Act to distinguish between cases involving confusion regarding
responsibility for quality on the one hand, and cases involving confusion
regarding other types of relationships on the other. Just as the Supreme Court
has read distinctions into the statute in the context of trade dress 138 and
135. Though in light of the research on brand alliances we discussed above, this type of
negative feedback seems unlikely.
136. The people responsible for writing section headings have now been sacked.
137. See, e.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart
Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-79 (3d Cir. 1993).
138. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000)
(distinguishing product design and product packaging trade dress and holding that only
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reasonable distinctions into other statutes, 139 we think courts could distinguish
between different types of alleged confusion and require evidence of
materiality where the alleged confusion relates not to responsibility for quality,
but to some other form of relationship. This particular distinction, we
acknowledge, would be easier to reconcile with the text of the statute in the
case of section 32 claims for registered trademarks since that section lacks
specificity about the nature of the relevant confusion. 140 Because section 43(a)
specifically refers to confusion regarding "the origin, sponsorship, or approval"
of the defendant's goods, 14 1 courts would have to distinguish between different
cases of confusion regarding sponsorship or approval, requiring evidence of
materiality where the alleged confusion of this sort did not imply responsibility
for quality. We do not think this type of distinction is inconsistent with the
Lanham Act or that it is a qualitatively different kind of distinction than the
distinction between product configuration and product packaging (neither of
. . .. 142
which is specifically referenced in the statute). Indeed, the Supreme Court
was willing to draw a similar distinction between authorship and source in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,14 3 which seemed to
presage our point. The Lanham Act, the Court said, "should not be stretched to
cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers."' 144 And some
courts already seem willing to consider materiality, evaluating evidence of
actual confusion based on whether that confusion is actually relevant to a
product packaging is capable of being inherently distinctive; product configuration can be
protected only with evidence of secondary meaning); cf Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that inherently distinctive, non-functional trade dress is
protectable without evidence of secondary meaning).
139. In antitrust, for instance, courts have long distinguished between reasonable and
unreasonable restraints of trade when applying the statutory prohibition against any restraint
of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."); see, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (2006) (making liable "[any person who shall, without the
consent of the registrant . . . use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive").
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
142. As a matter of fact, courts used to make a distinction between trademark and trade
dress and to require evidence of materiality in product design cases. See, e.g., Crescent Tool
Co. v. Kilbom & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917) ("[l]t is an absolute condition
to any relief whatever that the plaintiff ... show that the appearance of his wares has in fact
come to mean that some particular person ... makes them, and that the public cares who
does make them, and not merely for their appearance and structure." (emphasis added)); see
also Lunney, supra note 125, at 376-78 (discussing this approach in more detail).
143. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
144. Id. at 33; cf Pharmacommunications Holdings Inc. v. Avencia Int'l Inc., [2009]
F.C. 144 (Can.) (requiring proof of harm in Canadian law).
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consumer purchasing decision. 145 And courts have already had to engage in
similar legerdemain in interpreting subsection (B) but not (A) of the Act to
require materiality;146 they could easily require it in some subsection (A) cases
as well. Given how entrenched the current understanding of trademark law has
become over the last several decades, however, it may actually be easier to
achieve this reform in Congress.
Whether courts or Congress are the actors, the change we propose is
straightforward: the law should require that trademark owners claiming
infringement based on confusion regarding anything other than source or
responsibility for quality must demonstrate the materiality of that confusion to
consumer purchasing decisions. That is, we should not presume social harm
from likely confusion regarding other types of relationships, as we do with
confusion as to the source of products. Instead, plaintiffs should have to prove
that harm, as they do in false advertising cases. And the plaintiff should have to
show that it is confusion about the relationship between the parties that is
material to consumers' purchasing decisions; it is not sufficient that the
trademark standing alone is material to purchasing decisions. To have a claim
against the producers of a television show in which the characters used an
APPLE computer, for example, Apple would have to demonstrate both that the
presence of the computer is likely to confuse consumers about a relationship
between Apple and the show and that consumers' belief that such a relationship
exists is likely to impact their decision to watch the show. It would not be
enough to show that the use of the APPLE computer captured viewers'
attention.
Thus, the structure of trademark claims under our approach will look
something like this: traditional trademark claims about source confusion among
competitors will be subject to the traditional rules, which presume harm to the
plaintiff upon evidence of likely consumer confusion, so long as the alleged
confusion arises before purchase and is not dispelled. So too will certain classes
of confusion that don't strictly involve competitors: plaintiffs who are thought
by consumers to guarantee the quality of the defendant's products (franchisors,
for example) and plaintiffs who have not yet entered an adjacent market but are
sufficiently likely to do so that consumers regard them as quality guarantors.
Owners of famous marks that can show likely harm to the mark in its core
market from tarnishment or blurring can assert a dilution claim. Trademark
owners who cannot satisfy any of these criteria can still bring a claim for
confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, but only if they can demonstrate that
145. See, e.g., Riverbank, Inc. v. River Bank, 625 F. Supp. 2d 65, 74 (D. Mass. 2009).
We think the definition of material confusion the judge used in Riverbank is likely too broad,
but the fact that materiality was important at all shows a path to the goal we would like to
reach in existing law.
146. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under
the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 871-73 (1999) (parsing the weak legislative support
for a materiality requirement in false advertising).
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the defendant's false or misleading representations as to sponsorship or
affiliation are actually likely to affect consumers' purchasing decisions.
We acknowledge that a finding of liability based on material confusion in a
downstream market represents a windfall of sorts to trademark owners,
particularly if courts award damages. As the evidence in Part III demonstrated,
trademark owners are not normally hurt by uses of this sort. Nonetheless,
because consumers are hurt in the downstream market, we think it makes sense
to permit the trademark owner to sue in cases where a mistaken belief about the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is likely to affect the
purchasing decisions of a substantial number of consumers. 147 But we
emphasize that it is injury to consumers, and not some putative right on the part
of the trademark owner to own non-competitive uses of the mark, that justifies
a lawsuit in these circumstances. 
1 4 8
Cases subject to the materiality requirement, we propose, would include
not only the sports team and media cases we discussed in Part I, but also cases
involving the so-called "merchandising right."' 149 Indeed, the approach we
advocate might actually offer a reasonable middle ground in the debate over the
merchandising right, giving trademark owners control over the sale of T-shirts,
hats, and other memorabilia if, but only if, consumers are actually influenced in
their purchasing decisions by the belief that the trademark owner sponsored the
goods. 150 We think it is unlikely that the Dutch soccer fans we mentioned in
147. In our view, this substantiality requirement ought to track the requirement that an
"appreciable number of ordinarily prudent consumers" be confused. McGregor-Doniger Inc.
v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]n appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the
goods."); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[T]he law has long demanded a showing
that the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an
appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care."). We
believe, however, that the thresholds courts have established in the confusion context are
likely too low since research suggests a significant level of background confusion among
consumers. See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARlz. ST. L.J. 1033, 1098 (2010) (reporting that over 26% of
respondents in an empirical study thought that the word "wonderful" indicated the source of
the chocolate coconut macaroons depicted in the stimulus, even when the authors placed the
word in small font in the bottom right-hand comer of the package and regarded the use as
"non-trademark use").
148. We make the case against such market-ownership claims in Lemley & McKenna,
supra note 90.
149. On the dubious legal provenance of the merchandising right, see, for example,
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 91, at 472-78.
150. Compare Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062,
1078 (9th Cir. 2006) (assuming confusion from similarity of marks in case in which
defendant sold car logo key chains, notwithstanding clear disclaimer), and Boston Athletic
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1 st Cir. 1989) (dispensing with proof of likely confusion
in case involving Boston Marathon T-shirts), with WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926
F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (requiring proof of likely confusion in case involving
unauthorized TV broadcast of the Boston Marathon). Tom McCarthy refers to the question
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our Introduction actually took the pants from a beer company because they
thought there was a sponsorship relationship between Bavaria and the Dutch
team, but we concede it's possible. FIFA should have an opportunity to prove
that they did, but we certainly shouldn't assume such a connection matters
without evidence. And again, to be clear, what FIFA should have to show is
that a relationship between the beer company and the Dutch national team
would be material to the fans' decisions to wear the pants. It is not enough that
the colors were important to the fans.
We think our al1roach would also ameliorate the problems with celebrity
endorsement cases. Even in those cases where use of a celebrity identity
creates confusion about a relationship between the celebrity and the user, it's
unlikely the perceived relationship entails control over the quality of the user's
goods or services. These cases therefore involve confusion regarding the other
types of relationships we've tried to distinguish, and that plaintiffs in these
cases should have to prove materiality. But we can imagine that some uses of a
celebrity's identity-those that really do suggest the celebrity's endorsement of
the user's products or services-might be material to consumers' decisions to
purchase the goods or services they think the celebrity has endorsed. These
cases, then, are a good example of why we don't rule out non-quality-related
confusion categorically.
Our approach may even provide a way to think about trademark use in
virtual worlds. 152 The sale of virtual goods is a bit of an edge case. There is no
real good here for which the trademark owner might stand as a guarantor of
quality. So we think in the ordinary case that any confusion arising in the
context of a virtual transaction involves an assumption about affiliation or
sponsorship between the trademark owner and the virtual world. We can
imagine, however, that over time circumstances might arise in which the
quality or source of the virtual good is itself at issue. If Gucci virtual purses last
longer or have features that other purses don't, selling a non-Gucci purse
without those features as a Gucci purse would create the sort of harm trademark
law has traditionally sought to prevent. If that happens, it shouldn't matter that
as a circular one because if consumers think a particular use requires authorization then it
will require authorization. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 24:9. And if courts take the Jacoby
view that we need only ask consumers what they think the law ought to be, see Jacob
Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense in Measuring Sponsorship Confusion, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 63 (2006), confusion analysis will be circular indeed. But this is a problem largely
endemic to trademark law. Requiring proof that a representation is likely to affect consumer
purchasing decisions would reduce the circularity problem since it is not just expressed
consumer belief about the law, but actual consumer behavior, that plaintiffs would have to
show.
151. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. See Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands: Why You Should
Monitor the Misuse of Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENr. L.J. 667, 678-80 (2009) (documenting cases in which virtual world vendors sell
branded "goods" without authorization).
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the good is virtual rather than real. 153
To be sure, there is some risk under our approach that plaintiffs will be
unable to prove in court harm they did in fact suffer. But we think there are
ways to mitigate that risk. For example, courts could draw inferences or create
presumptions of materiality for certain classes of explicit statements like "Coke
is the official drink of American Idol," just as false advertising law currently
treats literal falsity more harshly than literally true but allegedly misleading
representations. 154 And the opposite risk-that plaintiffs will prove materiality
by dubious evidence-can be reduced by demanding a logical causal chain
showing injury to the trademark owner. 155 In any event, the risk of false
negatives must be balanced against the costs of sponsorship and affiliation
litigation, which as we suggested in Part II are substantial.
CONCLUSION
Trademark law has expanded dramatically in the last century to the point
where it now prohibits conduct by companies that seems unlikely to confuse
consumers in any material way. The result is a long series of seemingly absurd
decisions. We think the problem is that courts have presumed that if consumers
are confused at all, that confusion is problematic. That presumption makes
sense when the plaintiff and defendant are competitors and consumers are
confused about the source or the quality of the products they are buying. But
the same presumption makes no sense in cases of sponsorship or affiliation
confusion because the evidence suggests that most such confusion does not in
fact affect consumer purchasing decisions.
153. See, e.g., Brendan James Gilbert, The Second Life of Intellectual Property 6-8
(June 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1409091
(documenting trademark dispute between two virtual retailers on Second Life, SLART
Gallery and SLART Garden).
154. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int'l, Inc.,
862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that materiality is presumed if statements are
literally false but must otherwise be proven).
155. An example from a false advertising case in which the court found the false
representation to be material is instructive. In Por Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc.,
plaintiff Porn Wonderful presented credible evidence that consumers sent questions to both
Pom Wonderful and Purely Juice which made clear that they were "extremely concerned
about product ingredients (including sugar) and how those ingredients would either improve
or hinder their health." No. CV-07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 17,
2008). Further, Pom Wonderful's internal market research showed that the "primary reason
its customers drank POM Wonderful [was] for the health benefits," and Purely Juice's
president and founder testified that Purely Juice would lose its position in the marketplace if
it could not label or advertise its product as "100% pomegranate juice" with "no sugar
added." Id. In light of this evidence, the court found that consumers were likely to base their
purchasing decisions on precisely the kinds of false statements contained in Purely Juice's
marketing, particularly the untrue statements that its products were "100% pomegranate
juice" and had "no sugar added." Id.
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We suggest that trademark law can best deal with sponsorship or affiliation
claims by taking a page from history and returning this subset of cases to its
roots in false advertising law. Believe consumers have been injured because a
Little League team uses your professional sports team name, because soccer
fans are wearing your team colors without your permission, or because a TV
show uses your soda in it? Our rule is simple: prove it.
